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Abstract-British cities of the mid-nineteenth century were insanitary. In many cases lack of street paving, 
insuflicient water, proliferating cesspools and open sewers turned them into cloying, degrading and 
offensive mires. Many of the urban workers, too poor to pay rent sufficient to meet the costs of these 
environmental services, were shuffled among damp dingy rooms into which the sun shone feebly and in 
which their physical odours were confined against any draughts. The relations between landlord and 
tenant were circumscribed by the indebtedness of the former and the penury of the latter. Water, sewerage 
and housing standards were left to the sway of the market while the effective demand for them was limited 
by low real wages. In the largest cities this filth was dangerous as well as offensive and public health 
reforms became ever more pressing. Yet the form in which this legislation was secured and the manner 
in which it was implemented were not as straightforward as this sketch of their crying necessity might 
suggest. 
In this paper, the English public health movement of 
the mid-nineteenth century is considered as part of 
two histories: the history of government growth and 
the history of environmentalist ideas. The emphasis 
here is on how these ideas were incorporated in 
coherent arguments for state intervention in the 
urban environment. Existing studies of public health 
reform document the main stages in the development 
of public concern and the extra-parliamentary pres- 
sure for legislation. It is widely recognised that public 
health reform took very great risks with the sanctity 
of property and that, as Henriques has written, 
“public intervention for health purposes meant inter- 
vention in the management of private property, since 
the seventeenth century the sacred cow of all sacred 
cows” [l]. It is also well established that in addition 
to the general opposition to restricting the free play 
of the market, there was a particular resentment hat 
the rights of local property owners to manage their 
collective affairs in autonomous local authorities 
were being attacked. Bruce, for example, has noted 
that “there was much resistance to government inter- 
ference in local affairs, even in such a matter as public 
health” [2]. Bruce referred to the parliamentary activ- 
ity bounded by the Public Health Acts of 1848 and 
1875 as “the period of environmental sanitary legis- 
lation” [2, p. 111. O’Riordan has claimed that “it is 
generally accepted that ‘public health’ is a major 
collective goal” and has even placed it second only to 
national security in a “hierarchy of national goals” 
[3]. Clearly, the enviromentalist public health move- 
ment must be counted as a great success. A society 
dedicated to the pursuit of private profit conceded the 
need to restrain the activities of urban property 
owners in the interest of more health living. Yet in the 
histories of public health reform this paradox is rarely 
met head on. How was it possible for reformers to 
square the circle of collectivism and private enter- 
prise? We know today that the two have proved 
compatible but the Victorians experienced the con- 
tradiction as the yawning possibility of the demise of 
the ethics of the market. Failure to confront this 
question directly makes it impossible to accurately 
characterise the reforms that were achieved: did they 
aim to enable or replace private markets? The con- 
fusion extends to the proper characterisation of the 
role of the most important public health reformer of 
the age, Edwin Chadwick. Chadwick was the arche- 
type of the new state servants, or bureaucrats, who 
staffed and animated government growth in the nine- 
teenth century. Between 1834 and 1854 he was central 
to most state innovations in social policy. Portraying 
Chadwick as the fountain head of the welfare state, 
historians have been unsure where to place his brand 
of collectivism on a continuum running from capital- 
ism to socialism. Given the importance of an accurate 
appreciation of the scope and limits of the modem 
state for modern politics and the common presen- 
tation of its commitments as a set of historically- 
acquired responsibilities, this uncertainty is of more 
than academic significance. 
This paper offers one perspective on this problem. 
It examines how arguments for enviromentalist pub- 
lic health policies were put together. It is suggested 
that these show a great sensitivity to precisely the 
paradox outlined above and that state intervention 
could be made compatible with private markets only 
at the cost of relating public health problems to 
market failure and thereby conceding that there were 
important sectors of the economy where the market 
could not be trusted to hold sway. The attack on 
private property was instead presented as an abdract 
defence of the virtues of free markets and the dangers 
of imperfect ones. This defence was placed within a 
broad cosmology emphasising the harmony between 
free markets, nature and mortality. Here, this is 
presented as an attempt by Chadwick to accumulate 
enough pertinent affirmations of his policy and avoid 
the crippling effects of running into relevant ideo- 
logical sanctions of his policy. In this regard, theories 
of market behaviour, of disease and of government 
were all of a piece and became interdependent parts 
of the case for reform. Three themes are developed in 
the paper: that public health reforms restuctured 
property rights; that these rights structured the re- 
forms to which they became subject; and that these 
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reciprocal developments were basic to the growth of 
government. As statement of fact, all three themes are 
probably self-evident and the aim of the paper is to 
explore them and their significance rather than to 
show that they are true; the focus here is not on 
whether but on how. The paper is in four sections. In 
the first, the point is made that nineteenth-century 
public health reforms were environmental regulations 
which took the responsibilities of property as the 
proper focus of intervention. In the second, the way 
that property was the medium for sanitary activity is 
briefly described. In the third, the way that the case 
for reform negotiated the veto implied by the in- 
violable rights of property is explored. Finally, the 
ideological sway of private property is considered as 
an aspect of its political dominance. 
ENVIRONMENTALISM AND SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY 
The environmentalism of nineteenth-century social 
thought is widely recognised. Malthus drew attention 
to the biological basis of society and, despite the 
ideological sway of the economics of pure com- 
petition, there proved to be no going back on this 
finding. As biological phenomena, people were 
clearly influenced by their environments. Buckle 
wrote of the environmentalist influences on religion 
with superstitious Catholics living in the frightening 
vulcanic Mediterranean lands and cool rational Prot- 
estants living on the tectonically more stable north 
European plain [4]. This line of reasoning was so 
pervasive that all sorts of issues became ‘environ- 
mentalised’ allowing people, for example, to seek 
architectural solutions to moral problems. Public 
health reform was clearly an environmental issue in 
the strongest sense. The regulation of the environ- 
ment, here, meant controlling property as opposed 
to controlling people. This is in clear contrast to a 
public health strategy based principally on control- 
ling the movement of people through quarantine. The 
emphasis was on places not people. The plague was 
shut out in the sixteenth and seventeenth-centuries 
whereas the seedbeds of cholera were cleaned up in 
the nineteenth. The contrast is not absolute since, of 
course, there was some, weak environmental regu- 
lation in sixteenth-century England and there were 
exclusionist principles behind the activities of the 
Port Sanitary Authorities during the later-nineteenth- 
century [S]. Nevertheless there are significant 
differences of emphasis here. An environmentalist 
public health strategy based on controlling places 
meant, in a society where land was privately owned, 
extending the social responsibilities attaching to the 
ownership of urban property. These extensions were 
many and varied. 
If we may speak of urban morbidity and mortality 
as the problem, then, the answer was to recognise a 
broader set of environmental responsibilities attach- 
ing to property. This was not an inevitable line of 
advance. Among the alternatives developed less 
strongly than this, there were attempts to deepen the 
legal responsibilities of the sick through various 
‘notifications of infectious diseases’ Acts. This strat- 
egy was applied most aggressively in the case of 
socially or politically marginal groups such as in the 
attempt to control venereal disease by regulating 
prostitutes. In the main, though, the greatest atten- 
tion was paid to the responsibilities of property. 
Landlords had their right to accept a fair price for an 
offered product tampered with. From the bye-laws of 
the 1840s through to the rights of local boards of 
health under the 1848 Public Health Act to approve 
building plans, the quality of the product to be sold 
was regulated. And this at a time when the links 
between building costs, rents and wages were well 
recognised. Then, the rights of the house-owner to 
lease out his premises were subject to controls on the 
habitation of cellars, the degree of overcrowding 
allowed under the 1851 Lodging Houses Act and 
even, under the 1848 Public Health Act, the extent to 
which tenants could accept a service, with respect o 
drainage, sewerage and water supply, which might 
convert the property into a health hazard. Further- 
more, certain specific land uses came under closer 
scrutiny with the driving out of towns of pigkeepers 
and cowkeepers, under the Nuisances Acts from 
1846, to say nothing of holding urban industries 
accountable to every twitching of the sanitary in- 
spector’s nose. 
Some of these new responsibilities fell to the urban 
local authorities. The General Board of Health, 
under the 1848 Public Health Act, was empowered to 
permit local authorities to raise unheard of sums on 
the security of the rates in order to undertake drain- 
age, sewerage or the provision of a municipal water 
supply. The Board was under an obligation to see 
first whether private enterprise might provide ade- 
quate services but these services could, then, by 
default, be developed under municipal ownership. 
Outside port cities, this was an unprecedented exten- 
sion of municipal property-holding and was different 
in kind from the corporation-based control of the 
market place which made up the greater part of 
communal ownership in the early modern town. 
Furthermore, since these new properties were ulti- 
mately funded from rates raised on landed property 
within the town, they qualified those landed property 
rights. In the second half of the nineteenth-century 
the new urban properties in workhouses, schools, 
sewers and water companies brought in their train 
expectations and interest payments which made 
serious inroads into the viability of small land- 
lordism, as Avner Offer shows [6], and set the stage 
for the economic and the political marginalisation of 
this group [7]. 
In an ecological sense, we might speak of the social 
control over the urban environment as an adaptive 
strategy, a means whereby society adjusted to the 
ecological pressures of large-scale city living. Yet the 
self-conscious nature of political developments en- 
tails that we specify how and why certain steps were 
taken. A small part of the answer lies in technology. 
Given a relatively wet climate, there is water available 
at reasonable cost to drive a water-closet based 
sewerage system. This sort of system requires some 
shared use of common facilities, such as sewers. The 
alternative is the more labour-intensive removal of 
sewage from cesspools or septic tanks. Even if, 
for economic and climatic reasons, the combined 
sewerage/drainage system was more suited to nine- 
teenth-century towns, there still remains the task of 
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explaining why they were financed in the way they 
were. It should be noted that the division between 
public goods and private goods is not a clear one. 
There is also the ideological damage done to private 
enterprise when it is suggested that certain services 
are not really suited to being placed on the same 
footing as all other forms of bourgeois property. Here 
again, there were, and continue to be, alternatives; 
from private water companies and commissions of 
sewers to publically owned but quasi-autonomous 
boards (like the former English Gas Boards) through 
to municipal services directly accountable to local 
councils. Accepting the case for some state direction 
in the field of public health left open a wide range of 
options with respect to the balance between public 
and private interests in financing, directing and pro- 
viding these services. 
What is striking about how urban authorities 
acquired property rights under public health legis- 
lation is that these powers were exercised by vestries 
or councils answerable to a propertied electorate and 
administered by a restricted ruling class. For logisti- 
cal reasons, one might expect these sorts of social 
responsibilities to be discharged locally but to tie 
them to a property rate underlines the paradox of 
local autonomy without the democratic dilutions 
implied by the wider and more dynamic tax base on 
which central government drew, with its excise duties 
and, increasingly, its income taxes. The sort of gov- 
ernment growth epitomised by public health reform 
qualified property rights by being based on a prop- 
erty tax and by attaching new responsibilities to the 
use and disposal of property. Inevitably, these sorts 
of changes in rights and responsibilities were subject 
to all sorts of class-based forces from the long battle 
within the towns over the municipal franchise to the 
guerilla war over the rates. Thus, as Brayshay and 
Pointon show, the case that civic authorities ought to 
be open to a broader section of property owners went 
hand in hand with the claim that the narrow basis of 
urban government led it to take too restricted a view 
of its social responsibilities [8]. An even wider section 
of property-owners consistently contested the asser- 
tion that sanitation was a matter for the rates. This, 
Chadwick’s ‘meanest class’, while rarely effective in 
Parliament gnawed away at the pretensions of re- 
forming urban governments and aimed to transfer 
their public health responsibilities towards the social 
purse and the central exchequer. 
The sort of public health reforms that were imple- 
mented bore the impress of these class struggles both 
because they were nurtured within political bodies 
which represented property and alsa because they 
surfaced in debates whose ground rules were based on 
property. The study of how propertied interests truc- 
tured the public health reforms to which they were 
subject reveals both a political and an ideological 
component. After all, local rates, unlike for example 
national income tax, were a tax solely on property. 
They particularly affected the lower middle classes 
who held much of their wealth in this form. Local 
government was financed by and constituted by this 
particular class interest. Yet this was to be the vehicle 
of a public health policy focussing on the regulation 
of property and passing on the costs of improvements 
to the owners of property. 
THE POLITICS OF PROPERTY 
From the shareholders of the private London 
water companies who sat in Parliament and removed 
Chadwick from the General Board of Health in 1854 
to the slum landlords who sat on vestries turning a 
blind eye to the sanitary conditions of their interests, 
there were a number of ways in which propertied 
interests could affect both the framing and the imple- 
mentation of public health reforms. The aim of the 
legislators was to offend these parties as little as 
possible both because of their recognised control over 
the use of the law and because the legislators shared 
a genera1 commitment to the rights of property. In 
general the responsibilities of property were held to 
be balanced by its rights of representation. Yet this 
operated quite unevenly both across different types of 
property and from place to place. The relations 
between public health strategies and the urban fran- 
chise need further study but along with the nature of 
the local economy it was probably a crucial control 
on the character and levels of sanitary activity. For 
Sheffield, Pollard showed that changes in the local 
franchise were related to shifts in the focus of sanitary 
activity with a broader franchise accompanying a 
more ambitious programme [9]. In many cases, the 
most dangerous properties were owned in the small- 
est units. So that where the authority consisted of a 
representative vestry and an executive board of trust- 
ees with a stricter property qualification for the latter, 
then, the division of responsibility between the two 
was an important determinant of the interference 
with property. In the London borough of Islington, 
for example, the primary control exercised by the 
vestry was in the setting of the rate. This held back 
any expensive capita1 projects such as drainage or 
sewerage but left scope for the Trustees to set up 
sanitary committees, in the period 1848-54, which 
policed the condition of individual small properties 
[IO]. In other words, while we might expect Vigier 
to be right in suggesting that a broader franchise 
meant a more responsive authority with a more inter- 
ventionist sanitary policy, we must nevertheless rec- 
ognise that the rating system fell heaviest on those 
small property owners who were most likely to have 
the dangerous small businesses or the least well- 
maintained houses [l I]. There was, therefore, a polit- 
ical bottleneck in the property hierarchy which pro- 
tected those above from higher rates and which saw 
the masses below as unpropertied and hence prone to 
make irresponsible claims on the municipal purse. 
Representation as a corollary of the responsibility 
of property was not only unevenly distributed it also 
influenced the form in which rights were conceived. 
As Corrigan and Sayer argue, the extension of the 
political community in the nineteenth century was a 
sharing of power between landed and other forms of 
property. The rights of labour power were conceived 
in the same forms and labourers were urged to be 
individuals who could be treated “as if they had, or 
could someday possess, bourgeois properties individ- 
ually without possessing profitable property” [12]; 
Labour power as a form of property might perhaps 
have been viewed as a common law right whose value 
could be defended against environmental dangers in 
much the same way as was supposedly available to 
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holders of other sorts of property. Instead the protec- 
tion of an individual’s health was more frequently 
conceived in terms of insurance. The principles of 
insurance offered a way of measuring the social costs 
of sickness. Chadwick and Farr were both concerned 
with insurance before they wrote about public health 
questions. In eliding thus the distinction between 
personal and social insurance the gap was also closed 
between a person’s right to health and society’s right 
to healthy people. Labour power was a form of social 
property and the same basis on which other forms of 
property was guarded against accident could be 
extended to the national labour force. To this extent 
unhealthy cities carried with them an imputed insur- 
ance cost as far as this national property asset was 
concerned. 
Property was represented, in various ways, on the 
agencies to whom the public health legislation was 
entrusted. Finally, of course, it was represented on 
the bench. During the tenure of the first General 
Board of Health, Ashley, a member of the Board, 
remarked ruefully to Chadwick, also a member, that 
“the magistrates are against us” [ 131. In Islington, the 
local board of health found the same problem. In 
defining a nuisance the opinion of Queen’s Council 
was that any court order applied only to the specific 
body of matter which was present at the time of the 
initial complaint. The point of law arose because of 
the delays involved in the local board of health 
seeking to enforce the provisions of the Nuisances 
Removal and Diseases Prevention Act against the 
owner of a dust-shoot. This delay, thought Mr Bod- 
kin Q.C., meant that the original magistrate’s order 
aginst the owner was no longer in force since “the 
matter removed must be the identical matter referred 
to by the order. It is now I apprehend impossible to 
show that the matter adjudicated upon on the 11 th 
February still remains, there may be similar matter 
emitting effusions equally offensive but this is not I 
think sufficient” [14]. This nice interpretation of the 
Act was singularly unhelpful. In addition local 
boards of health found the legal option expensive, 
cumbersome, tardy and uncertain. In Islington, in 
fact, the vigorous attempts of the board to punish the 
owners of filthy houses eventually foundered as 
magistrates interpreted the responsibilities of prop- 
erty as falling to those who had use of the property 
rather than those who owned it; a radical severance 
of responsibility and representation. This meant that 
if the board took upon itself to clean up properties 
which were certified to be dangerous but which the 
owners had been unwilling to amend, then the board 
would have to proceed against the poor tenants for 
compensation. The Trustees were appraised of the 
implications by their Highways Surveyor: 
The above decision will in great measure paralyse any efforts 
for purifying the houses of the poor, for if the occupiers of 
such houses were to be selected as the amenable parties their 
poverty would prevent their complying with orders that 
might be made upon them and the consequences would be, 
that the execution of such orders would devolve upon your 
committee thus casting a heavy burden upon the parish 
funds. The propriety of continuing to call upon parties to 
cleanse houses remains in abeyance [14, 11 February 18491. 
The cost and unworkability of the law was widely 
recognised as part of the defence of private property. 
In opposing the Nuisances Removal and Diseases 
Prevention Acts, one representative of the ‘offensive 
trades’ was “quite content that we should be left 
under the common law of England” feeling “a manu- 
facturer who has embarked a large sum of money, 
ought to have the security which an expensive process 
to go through gives” [15]. In a similar vein, Joseph 
Heron, the Town Clerk of Manchester, took a 
narrow rather than a broad view of the re- 
sponsibilities of property when he told a Select 
Committee: “I do not see why the owner should be 
made liable at all. In many cases the nuisances arise 
by the acts of the tenants, over whom he has no 
control” [15, q. 1506, p. 1851. 
The conception of rights to health, and the imple- 
mentation and interpretation of public health legis- 
lation were based on the rights, responsibilities and 
representation of private property. Property was the 
medium of intervention. This was recognised by the 
advocates of public health reform and, in abstract 
terms, they wished to uphold the institution of private 
property. In this area, we find a set of political 
struggles within the propertied classes anticipated by 
the ideological manoeuvrings of the reformers. In 
this, Chadwick was immensely significant and while 
we may note the role of doctors and journalists in 
establishing a sympathy for reform, it really took a 
philosophical and legal disposition lo establish its 
justice in the face of this propertied political nation. 
THE IDEOLOGY OF PROPERTY 
If the case for public health reform is seen as 
self-evident, then the activity of pressure groups 
becomes merely a sort of journalism. But to propose 
qualifying the rights of property, to take up the 
‘Condition of England Question’ with a view to 
interfering with those rights and to apparently give 
credence to the claims of the unpropertied on the 
public purse was to shake principles central to the 
heroic self-image of the Victorian bourgeoisie. What 
Edwin Chadwick did between the mid-1830s and the 
mid-1840s was to argue a case for sanitary reform 
which, while consistent with some of the rational- 
isations of this self-image, was also likely to result in 
effective legislation. This was an intellectual rather 
than a journalistic achievement. Chadwick’s argu- 
ments combined a theory of government. a ‘sanitary 
idea’ and an account of the relations between the 
social and natural worlds all of which celebrated the 
ethical and moral justifications for private property. 
As Flinn rightly noted “that Chadwick was the 
ultimate instrument of success was due in large 
measure to his rugged determination, to his humani- 
tarianism, and to his skill as a sociologist” [ 161. Flinn 
saw Chadwick’s sociological skills in the way he 
allowed the facts, rather then his preconceptions. 
dictate the formulation of the ‘sanitary idea’. Yet 
Chadwick was consistently cavalier in his treatment 
of evidence which appeared to challenge his ruling 
ideas [17, 181. Chadwick was a sociologist insofar as 
he had a theory of how society was held together 
and he developed his ideas on public health reform 
in dialogue with classical economy and utilitarian 
philosophy. Chadwick emerged with the best accept- 
able arguments for reform and these were gradually 
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adopted by much of the rest of the public health 
movement. These features may be highlighted by 
examining the writings of the public health move- 
ment on: the provision of public goods by private 
companies, theories of disease and the role of local 
government. On the first, we should notice the 
economic arguments employed. The second displays 
the importance of certain notions of the morality of 
nature. In all the morality of nature underwrites the 
morality of the market and points out the need for 
expert, technical solutions to environmental prob- 
lems which must, therefore, place great limitations on 
the suitability of direct democratic control over the 
public health. 
instituted was to encourage competition; and certainly in 
this as in other cases, it is only from competition, or from 
the expectation of competition, that a perfect security can 
be had for a good supply; but from the peculiar nature 
of these undertakings the principle of competition requires 
to be guarded by particular checks and limits in its applica- 
tion to them, in order to render it effectual without the risk 
of destruction to the competing parties, and thereby of 
serious injury to the public (211. 
In this context, a ‘good’ supply was primarily a cheap 
supply and the ‘particular checks’ recommended re- 
lated to the restriction of price rises rather than to 
either the quantity or quality of the water supplied. 
Private enterprise and public goods 
The contemporary literature on the dirty cities was 
replete with criticisms of both the quality and quan- 
tity of water supplied by private enterprise to the 
needy citizens. In one Health Towns Association 
pamphlet, after the usual panegyric against the 
London water companies, John Liddle, living in 
pre-air-conditioned times, exclaimed “What a mercy 
it is that we are not dependent upon a public com- 
pany for the supply of air!” [19]. But as Hector Gavin 
commented, in another pamphlet,“water, like railway 
companies, are trading bodies, in proposing to exe- 
cute public work, they only looked for a profitable 
investment for their capital” [20]. Bad conditions, of 
themselves, conferred no right to interfere with pri- 
vate enterprise. The market should, it was expected, 
ultimately ensure through open competition that the 
services provided were commensurate with the need, 
and thus demand, for those services. Instead, the 
public health lobby argued that the problems they 
identified arose from ‘abuses’ of the market. Chad- 
wick and his co-workers presented themselves as 
attempting to enforce the moral premises of political 
economy. These moral precepts were held to under- 
write all economic contracts. The water companies 
constituted a market ‘abuse’ because they were in- 
capable of fulfilling the contracts into which they had 
entered. Under such circumstances the government 
was bound to interfere. Gavin made this point ex- 
plicitly after his above remarks about the profit 
motive: 
But in order to execute these public works, they required, 
and obtained from the Legislature, extensive powers, privi- 
leges and immunities; it, therefore, became a duty of the 
Legislature. while granting these privileges, to take securities 
for the efficient performance of these public works. But this 
duty was not discharged and the powers with which these 
companies became invested, converted them into monopo- 
lies, under which the grievances, which I have detailed to 
you have sprung up [20, p. 491. 
The public health movement saw itself as policing 
imperfect competition. There is an ideological con- 
tinuity here with the concerns of those earlier radical 
‘economists’ such as Joseph Hume and their attacks 
on ‘Old Corruption’. For example, the ‘Select Com- 
mittee on the supply of water to the Metropolis’ 
(1821) was principally concerned, not with documen- 
ting water quality, but with the price of water and 
the monopoly profits which collusion between the 
companies secured: 
The public health movement of the 1840s moved 
beyond a concern simply with price to agitating 
about the quantity of water supplied but the logic of 
the argument was strikingly similar. It was proposed 
that the water companies could only fulfill their 
contracts, and the government discharge its super- 
visory obligations, if the water to be supplied was 
provided as cheaply and, they claimed, therefore as 
generally as possible. A general supply meant a 
constant supply at high pressure in contrast to an 
intermittent supply for a restricted group of sub- 
scribers. A general supply yielded lower unit costs 
due to scale economies and the reduction of water 
piracy by those not on the mains. A constant, high- 
pressure supply was likewise attended by lower unit 
costs because it obviated the need for large tanks at 
each communal water point. In a report prepared for 
Chadwick’s Town Improvement Company, Butler 
Williams claimed to demonstrate to the authorities of 
Bolton, Manchester and Salford that the costs of a 
restricted service fell most heavily upon wealthier 
property owners. If only two-thirds of houses rated 
at less than fl0 per annum were subscribers and only 
three-quarters of those rated at more than this, then, 
compared with the costs of a universal system, 
wealthier properties would face a rate one and two- 
thirds greater and poorer properties would face a rate 
increased by a half (221. Although these figures were 
based on the evidence given on the Nottingham 
waterworks to the Health of Towns Commission and 
a number of objections were raised to their extrapo- 
lation to places with different topographies, Thomas 
Hawksley’s evidence may well have been reliable at a 
general level since the higher unit costs of a partial 
system could only be passed on adequately to those 
consumers most able to pay, the rich [23]. Indeed, in 
another report for the Towns Improvement Com- 
pany, P. H. Holland argued that the financial success 
of the Ashton-under-Lyne waterworks was because: 
the works were economically constructed, the run- 
ning costs were very low, the company served most 
houses in the town, and, by having a constant supply, 
the company avoided the expense of providing tanks 
and cisterns [24]. 
The public health movement thus suggested that 
consumers had a right to low unit cost. The poor 
were not, in this respect, effective economic agents 
since, by themselves, they were unable to ensure that 
the companies provided cheap and general water 
supplies. In a pamphlet of 1847, Thomas Southwood 
Smith set out a comprehensive review of these 
arguments: 
The principle of the acts under which these companies were Constant and high pressure isthe most economical . it is 
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also universally applicable; and yet the public have no 
power to enforce its general adoption. If the legislature 
grant these [necessary] privileges and powers [to the water 
companies], it has the undoubted right, and it is its duty, to 
take securities for the due performance of the service in 
question. The service in the present case can be performed 
only on one condition, namely that the supply of water be 
constant and at high pressure (251. 
In urging intervention in the case of the private 
commissions of sewers, a similar strategy was adop- 
ted. Conditions were undoudtedly bad, but to get a 
purchase on private enterprise, the commissions had 
to be convicted of transgressing the moral assump- 
tions of economic contracts freely entered into. In St 
James Westminster about three-quarters of the 
houses examined by a ‘committee of health and 
sanitary improvement’ were found to be without 
‘distinct drainage’ and this in an area where the 
Westminster Commission of Sewers had raised over 
half a million pounds in the previous 22 years [26]. 
Mismanagenent of funds was a common complaint. 
Of the Tower Hamlets Commission of Sewers one 
ratepayer from Hackney claimed that it built main 
sewers to which none of the inhabitants of Hackney 
could afford to have a drain connected, it did not 
audit its collectors’ accounts and, most seriously, the 
Commission was wasting money, 47% of its income 
went on management costs [27]. 
As with the water companies, early parliamentary 
attention centered on these administrative abuses 
rather than on the defective service provided; only 
one of the London commissions had an average 
attendance of its commissioners at business meetings 
of greater than one quarter and all were open to 
charges of jobbery [28, 291. The parliamentary in- 
quiries of the 1840s more aggressively pilloried the 
standard of the service and the competence of the 
officials. The interchanges between Chadwick and 
Richard Kelsey, surveyor to the City Commission of 
Sewers, were frequently abusive and at one point 
Kelsey was driven to defend himself against criticisms 
of his sewers with the claim that he could not smell 
[30]. There was, however, more to the public health 
movement’s case than this. There was Chadwick’s 
“system of arterial drainage”. In making the case 
against the commissions of sewers, this occupied the 
same position that a constant high-pressure supply of 
water did in the argument about the need to reform 
the water companies; It was the alternative system 
which alone could supply the service contracted for 
at a good price. Whatever the psychological under- 
tones of the striving after perpetual motion implied 
by his scheme, and, in a letter of 1845 to Lord Francis 
Egerton, Chadwick explicitly spoke of being able to 
“realise the Egyptian type of eternity by bringing as 
it were the serpent’s tail into the serpent’s mouth”, it 
was certainly appealingly symmetrical [13, p. 2221. 
Every house would be drained, and the common 
sewers would lead to a pumping station from which 
the sewer water would be pumped to the surrounding 
agricultural land thereby increasing the town’s food 
supplies. The scheme aimed at “combining the 
advantages of town and country<onferring health 
on one and abundance on the other” [31]. For a 
working class audience it was stressed that this 
disproved the gloomy forecasts of Malthus: 
For as it is known that there is no waste in nature, so has 
it also now become manifest that. but for man’s ignorant 
wastefulness, there need be no occasion to apprehend the 
pressure of population upon food; the means of its repro- 
duction being ever proportioned to the amount of hs 
consumption, and the limit set to the numbers of mankind 
being regulated, not by pestilence and war, but by the 
power, and wisdom. and goodness of Him who ‘filleth all 
things living with plenteousness’ [32]. 
The similarity with the arguments about the water 
supply are clear. Once again, the solution reaffirmed 
the moral basis of free markets; there was a beneficent 
harmony between the ideal market situation (a cheap 
supply) and a socially desirable state of affairs (a 
good, general provision). 
This benevolent harmony only held good if Chad- 
wick could impose his system as a whole. Without 
improved, increased water supplies, the sewers would 
remain stagnant while, without the sale of liquid 
manure, the arterial system would be prohibitively 
expensive. The scheme was less practical than the 
proposals for improving the water supply. Morewood 
pointed to several problems with the details presented 
in the parliamentary reports and in the papers of 
Chadwick’s second, and equally unsuccessful, excur- 
sion into private enterprise, the Metropolitan Sewage 
Company. First, he identified Chadwick’s failure to 
include the costs of draining the agricultural land to 
be watered in his calculations. Secondly, he showed 
that while Chadwick proposed to transport liquid 
manure in sewer water, his transport costs only 
comprehended the movement of the liquid manure, 
about one-tenth of the total matter involved [33]. 
Although this application of sewage to agricultural 
land was probably the least successful aspect of 
Chadwick’s ‘sanitary idea’, it was not the only source 
of problems. Chadwick’s broad dismissal of most 
engineers left him open to attacks on points of detail. 
The Surrey and Kent Commission of Sewers was 
surely right to argue that he should have presented 
some systematic evidence on building practices before 
making the sweeping statements contained in the 
1842 Sanitary Report [34]. In fact, as they claimed, he 
relied upon John Roe (the surveyor to the Holborn 
and Finbury Commission) for his information on the 
practices of the several metropolitan commissions. 
The Westminster Commission complained that: 
The truth is evident, that the Secretary of the Poor Law 
Commission has been content to inform himself in respect 
of the Metropolitan sewage by special deference to the 
opinion of one individual. whose object has been to give 
himself importance by vaunting his own contrivances, by 
exalting his own commission, exaggerating his own success, 
and with unbecoming boldness casting unjust reflections on 
the adjoining commissions, traducing the competency of his 
brother surveyors of the surrounding jurisdictions [35]. 
In his eagerness to condemn prevailing building 
practices, he implied that Roe was the only metro- 
politan engineer to build his sewers with the more 
efficient curved rather than flat floors. Chadwick’s 
favoured rounded bottoms had been a feature of new 
sewers in the Westminster Commission through the 
previous 50 years and the City Commission claimed 
that flat-bottomed sewers were a legacy from the past 
and were now in a minority in the City [35, p. 14; 361. 
If we are to understand why the public health 
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movement seemed so impatient with contradictory 
details and why it did not simply document the 
appalling environmental conditions in making a case 
for public health reform, then, we need to see the 
logic of their consistent programme, their continuous 
chain of reasoning. The first links in the chain were 
propositions central to, rather than in conflict with, 
the veneration of private property. Some of the later 
links were of a more scientific or technical character. 
In this area, there was, in Chadwick’s view a problem 
of communication. These were not matters on which 
the ignorant could sensibly be asked to decide. The 
claim that matters of expertise should be passed down 
for implementation rather than evaluation and the 
conviction that such matters lay at the heart of the 
sanitary idea, led Chadwick to a very specific view of 
the obstacles to sanitary improvement at a local level. 
Parochial authorities 
In many ways, the public health movement con- 
victed parochial authorities of the same inefficiency, 
jobbery and ignorance that it saw as characteristic of 
other unreformed bodies like the water companies 
and commissions of sewers. Local autonomy was 
dear to the Victorian bourgeoisie. It signified the 
political sway of propertied classes and independence 
from central tyranny by being the control of a 
community by its local propertied elite. Public health 
reform inevitably presented a potential threat to that 
autonomy by imposing a new set of responsibilities 
on property without allowing local ruling groups the 
right to veto those qualifications. The links between 
knowledge and centralisation were contingent upon 
restricting the ability of parochial authorities to 
improvise solutions to the problems with which they 
were faced. 
This strategy of containment with its attendant 
elevation of the expert as a centralising focus is quite 
evident in the publications of the public health move- 
ment but it is clearest in the publications of the 
General Board of Health on the lessons of the cholera 
epidemic of 1848-9. The problems faced at a local 
level were analysed almost solely in terms of the 
difficulties the General Board had in getting them to 
follow its instructions. Two major problems admitted 
by the Board were the fact that the poor law author- 
ities had taken a rather narrow view of their re- 
sponsibilities and, secondly, that too many local 
authorities were not yet fully aware of the irresistible 
case for sanitary activity. With regard to the pre- 
ventive measures urged by the General Board, it was 
noted that: 
The provision intended by the legislature was one for the 
common protection against impending dangers, as has been 
stated to all classes, against which the individual means of 
private persons were inadequate. But the common functions 
of the Poor-L.aw Guardians related exclusively to one class, 
the destitute or pauper class only. Notwithstanding the 
scope of the Act, and explanatory notifications, the first and 
common impression of the guardians of the poor was, to 
confine the measures of prevention to the destitute, and 
administer it according to their settled practice, as respects 
the relief of paupers, which is to do nothing except on 
application, and then only upon proof given of the urgency 
of the case [37]. 
This effectively meant that the public health authority 
only saw patients when they were in a state of 
collapse. The guiding principle of the ‘sanitary idea’ 
was that prevention would be cheaper and more 
effective then cure. In general, the central authority 
found that it could encourage the willing but not 
coerce the reluctant authorities. Chadwick put this 
down to the incomplete diffusion of the proofs of the 
sanitary idea: 
The chief obstacles to the general and early adoption of 
measures of prevention arise from the difficulty of com- 
municating to those whom it is necessary to convince. such 
information as may satisfy their minds of the incomparable 
greater efficacy of measures of prevention than of those that 
are merely palliative or curative [37, p. 1481. 
What Chadwick omitted to discuss were the problems 
posed by the local opposition to the 1834 Poor Law 
Amendment Act. Local poor law authorities were 
still, in many cases, actively resisting control by 
the central Poor Law Board. Certainly in terms of 
central-local relations, the decision to work through 
the poor law boards of guardians put many places 
beyond the direct control of the General Board. In 
London, as late as 1867 one third of the area was 
“being regulated by local Acts that made the parishes 
independent of control by the Poor Law Board” [38]. 
TO understand why, despite these difficulties, 
Chadwick continued to insist that the poor law 
unions were the appropriate ‘modern’ authorities 
through which public health activity should be di- 
rected, that greater central control was required and 
that the experience of 1848-9 underlined these points, 
we must remember how important a part adminis- 
trative structures played in the public health propa- 
ganda. In 1842 Chadwick wrote of the 1831-2 cholera 
epidemic that: 
The nuisances which favoured the introduction and spread 
of the cholera were for the most part within the cognisance 
of the Leets [manorial ocal authorities], and could not have 
existed had their powers been properly exercised, yet SO 
complete was the desuetude of the machinery of these courts 
that it appeared nowhere to be thought of as applicable, and 
the new and special machinery of the Boards of Health were 
created for the purpose of meeting the pestilence [ 16, p. 3601. 
With existing bodies inadequate, Chadwick proposed 
investing these abandoned powers in the poor law 
unions; the prevention of disease would be in their 
interest as this would reduce the number of sick on 
the poor rates: 
When the extent of the removable causes of sickness and 
mortality are more clearly and extensively understood, as 
they will be, the Boards of Guardians will of necessity 
occupy much of the position of the Leet, as a body fitted to 
act on complaints made, and to reclaim the execution of the 
law against omissions and infractions which occasion illness 
or injury to the most helpless classes [16, p. 3961. 
Equally important, for Chadwick, was the fact that 
the poor law unions were supposed to be subject to 
some form of central direction and inspection and 
might appoint officers who were beyond ‘the influ- 
ence of petty and sinister interests’ by being account- 
able to a central authority rather than just local 
patronage or politics [38]. 
194 GERRY KEARNS 
Chadwick was a fanatical centraliser. Lyon 
Playfair noticed his dogmatism on this point: 
I recollect, on one occasion, trying to argue with him as to 
the need of throwing greater esponsibility on localities, and 
lessening the functions of central government so as to make 
them supervisory rather than administrative. My arguments 
were met with this stern rejoinder-‘Sir, the Devil was 
expelled from heaven because he objected to centralisation, 
and all those who object to centralisation oppose it on 
devilish grounds!’ [39]. 
Chadwick saw the New Poor Law as a vehicle for 
‘expert’, centralised government which alone would 
allow the full implementation of his ‘sanitary idea’. 
He argued that the obstacles to effective measures at 
a local level were a lack of strong, correct, central 
direction rather than, say, the inability of parochial 
authorities to force water companies, commissions of 
sewers and landlords to improve the living conditions 
of the poor. Expert knowledge was, he believed, a 
scarce commodity which was more efficiently de- 
ployed by central direction than by entrusting 
scientific questions to uninformed local representa- 
tive bodies. To sustain the claim that imperfections in 
the market needed proper policing and that this 
policing was properly the job of technical experts, 
required centralisation as an appropriate vehicle of 
correct technology but also explicitly confronted 
prevailing notions of the responsibilities and local 
representation of property. This was supportable 
only so long as the new technology was grafted onto 
an even deeper sense of the morality of private 
property than was threatened by the attack on local 
autonomy. In other words, a balance had to be struck 
between, on one hand, seeing central intervention as 
the only way to get the expert control of the eviron- 
ment thought to be required and, on the other, 
directly attacking the integrity of local property 
owners with their independent local authorities. This 
new technology needed more to recommend it than 
the say-so of Chadwick’s chosen engineers. Chadwick 
achieved this by returning to environmentalist heor- 
ies of disease and recovering from them a statement 
about the moral and divine purpose in nature. If he 
could link his sanitary engineering to a theory of 
disease which brought in the support of referring to 
God’s plan-for-the-world in natural design, then, 
local opposition to the new technology could be 
presented as flouting the laws of nature. 
Theories of disease 
The morality of the market was, to Chadwick, a 
natural phenomenon. In other words, it rested on 
natural forces and replicated the morality of nature. 
Natural phenomena were not seen as ethically neu- 
tral. In their study of urban mortality, the public 
health reformers tried to tie the behaviour of diseases 
such as cholera to a world view in which they made 
sense as a prompter of the ‘sanitary idea’. For our 
purposes, what is significant is the conviction among 
the public health pressure group that in certain ways 
the aetiology of epidemic disease underlined the sorts 
of conclusions they drew about the moral basis of the 
‘sanitary idea’. To this extent, the fact that in medical 
circles a more open and empirical approach was 
adopted is to be seen as a contrast to, rather than a 
basis for, the confident anticontagionism of leading 
public health campaigners [ 18, 40, 41, 421. Public 
health is pre-eminently about the interaction between 
the natural and social worlds. If Chadwick had 
certain beliefs about the natural harmony of the 
market, then, he was driven, in this area, to allow the 
natural world either to reinforce or to confound that 
harmony. In fact he believed the former. as did many 
of his colleagues. If it is conceded that in their 
theories of disease transmission, their complete world 
view was at stake, then, the tenacity with which they 
clung to anticontagionism becomes understandable. 
In examining how public health reformers treated 
the subject of disease transmission, two departures 
from what one might regard as scientific ‘best prac- 
tice’ stand out. First, the tendency to see the robust- 
ness of any proposition in terms of how it gelled with 
a consistent world view rather than in terms of the 
balance of evidence for the proposition considered on 
its own. Secondly, a tendency to see if the proposition 
was consistent with various facts rather than at- 
tempting to set it up in a form inviting falsification. 
This second characteristic often led to the use of facts 
as illustrations rather than tests of various propo- 
sitions. Chadwick epitomised both of these features. 
In parliamentary reports he thundered on about the 
non-contagious nature of cholera and in the papers 
of the General Board of Health he maintained that 
the epidemic of 1848-9 had not shaken the truth of 
this theory. 
Chadwick worked with Southwood Smith and 
Richard Owen on the Metropolitan Sanitary 
Commission. Southwood Smith probably first drew 
Chadwick’s attention to the significance of the non- 
contagiousness of diseases capable of assuming epi- 
demic dimensions. Owen was a leading physiologist 
whose views on this matter matched Chadwick’s, In 
the First Report of the Metropolitan Sanitary Com- 
mission, they claimed that “there is no evidence that 
cholera spreads by communication of the infected 
with the healthy” [43]. The empirical basis of 
contrary arguments was devalued by stating that 
“suddenness of attack is apparent only, and not real” 
[44]. They suggested that cholera was invariably 
preceded by a stage of premonitory diarrhoea so that 
the disease could be developing within a person well 
before its peculiar distinguishing features appeared. It 
was, therefore, impossible to infer a sequence of 
disease contraction from a series of deaths or even a 
series of conventionally-defined attacks. The clus- 
tering of attacks in time and space were the features 
to which contagionists drew attention. On this anti- 
contagionist reasoning, the clustering in time could 
not be reliably identified and the clustering in space 
was due to the Ipcalisation of environmental defects, 
primarily the piles of decomposing filth which were 
thought to induce diseases uch as cholera. 
While the medical debates negotiated evidence 
contradicting the anticontagionist case by developing 
a theory of contingent contagionism specifying the 
special circumstances under which a disease such as 
cholera might become epidemic and contagious, 
Chadwick and his colleagues tried to explain away 
this contradictory evidence by sticking to anti- 
contagionist theory and setting out the predisposing 
and efficient causes of cholera which might, under 
certain conditions, lead the disease to display a 
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spatial concentration giving the appearance of con- 
tagiousness. Predisposing causes selected individuals 
by their congenital defects or their poverty. They 
were of very limited significance, suggested the anti- 
contagionists, and little could be done about them. 
Far more important were the efficient causes which 
were environmental: 
These physical causes of disease may affect various localities 
and different classes of persons, but are most common and 
virulent in the neglected istricts and dwellings of the poor, 
who are peculiarly exposed to the aggravating influences of 
such causes-not necessarily connected with their condition 
in life. but capable of being removed by efficient drainage, 
cleansing, improvements of buildings, ventilation and a 
sufficient supply of good water. It is too commonly sup- 
posed that the evils above adverted to are the inseparable 
concomitants of poverty [45]. 
After the 1848-9 epidemic, the general Board of 
Health concluded that its ideas had been completely 
vindicated. However, it had been widely argued by 
others that those who attended the sick were at 
greater risk of catching cholera and that contagious 
spread must take place in these cases. Indeed, several 
registrars had noted such circumstances on their 
death returns, some of which were cited in contem- 
porary newspapers [46]. The General Board acknowl- 
edged that “several alleged facts were recorded in the 
Registrar-General’s Returns, with reference to the 
metropolis” [37, p. 181. The notion of predisposing 
and efficient causes was then used to explain away 
these alleged facts and to effectively place the anti- 
contagionist theory beyond empirical falsification. In 
line with this theory the medical practitioner selected 
by Southwood Smith to investigate allegations that 
washerwomen attending on cholera cases had caught 
the disease from dirty linen found that “not a single 
case can be proved to be owing to contagion” and in 
all cases: 
The attack can be at least as well assigned to other causes 
as to the alleged one. In one case I ascertained that the 
deceased id not wash the infected clothes, while the person 
who did escaped. In three others, at least, the disease 
manifested itself before the linen was washed. In nearly 
every instance the condition of the house and the street or 
court inhabited by the patient was of the most dangerous 
condition [37, p. 34). 
Only the ten cases where the registrars had suggested 
that the washerwomen had caught the disease from 
infected bed linen were investigated; the cholera 
mortality for this occupational group as a whole was 
not considered. More seriously, to restrict the proof 
of contagionism to cases where no other factors at all 
could have operated was hardly even-handed. This 
special pleading is even clearer in the General Board’s 
discussion of the mortality of nurses: 
We made a careful examination into all the cases that were 
brought under our notice, in which nurses were reported to 
have caught the disease from a close attendance on an 
infected person. In every case thus investigated, we found 
either that the nurse had been previously suffering under 
premonitory diarrhoea, in some cases for several days 
together, which she had neglected, or that she had commit- 
ted some act of intemperance, or was exhausted by over- 
fatigue; predisposing causes [ofl . . powerful influence [47]. 
Note here that no consideration is given to the 
possibility of the premonitory diarrhoea having been 
contracted during attendance on some earlier cholera 
case and note too that in the midst of an epidemic the 
theory of contagion cannot be established in the case 
of tired nurses. Chadwick consistently refused to 
acknowledge a theory of contingent contagionism, the 
idea that under certain circumstances the disease 
could become contagious. For him, the contagionists 
had to claim that contagion was the only way that 
cholera could spread and also that given the presence 
of infected people its spread was inevitable. On his 
reading the contagionists needed, therefore. to believe 
that the disease would advance in a continuous and 
regular way, in which case they were wrong “there 
being in general no regular continuity in its course, 
but its progress consisting in a succession of local 
outbreaks” [37, pp. 34-351. Furthermore, he noted 
that “in numerous instances individuals arrived in 
uninfected localities with the disease upon them, and 
died without communicating the infection to anyone, 
and without the spread of the disease” [37, p. 331. 
This special pleading allowed Chadwick and his 
colleagues to conclude that the anticontagionist 
theory explained ail the known facts. It had a system- 
atic grasp of reality and was, therefore, suggestive of 
correct policies. Thus Florence Nightingale insisted in 
a letter to William Farr: “Quarantine follows logi- 
cally and inevitably on “contagion”-as Sanitary 
measures on “non-contagion” [48]. Indeed, it was the 
possibility that William Pym, at the Privy Council, 
might declare a quarantine in the event of cholera 
returning to Europe that led Chadwick to devote 
most of the Second Report of the Metropolitan 
Sanitary Commission to articulating the anti- 
contagionist case. He was thoroughly disgusted when 
Pym announced a quarantine anyway and he com- 
plained that “the results of the enquiry aided by the 
first physiologist in Europe, Professor Owen, the 
recommendations of the General Board of Health 
were set at nought, suddenly, summarily, without the 
slightest notice given or reason assigned” [49]. Chad- 
wick clearly believed that his ‘sanitary idea’ had the 
imprimatur of Nature and anticontagionism was 
important in this regard. Through a number of 
seemingly independent channels he established anti- 
contagionism as the official doctrine in opposition to 
the more sophisticated medical theory of contingent 
contagionism. His theory of disease provided im- 
portant support for his environmentalist public 
health strategy. It was integral to the linking of 
nature, morals and markets in one continuous chain 
of reasoning which, as a whole, was more powerful 
than the sum of its individual parts. 
THE ‘SANITARY IDEA’ AS IDEOLOGY 
Therborn usefully suggests that ideologies orient 
people in their worlds in at least three ways: by telling 
people what exists; by telling them”what is possible, 
providing varying types and quantities of self- 
confidence and ambition, and different levels of aspir- 
ation”; and by telling them“what is right and wrong, 
good and bad” [SO]. It would appear that the ‘sani- 
tary idea’ functioned in each of these three ways. 
These sorts of ideas do not float free of particular 
social contexts and here again Therborn has some 
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helpful observations in speaking of the way the 
implementation of ideologies is either affirmed or 
sanctioned by the context in which they are applied. 
Affirmation occurs if, when someone “acts in accord- 
ance with the dictates of ideological discourse, then 
the outcome predicted by ideology occurs”. Altema- 
tive views of the possible and the good mesh with, in 
the case of environmental management, prevailing 
power structures when competing ideologies are fol- 
lowed: “If every ideology operates within a matrix of 
affirmations and sanctions, then the competition, 
coexistence or conflict of different ideologies is de- 
pendent on the non-discursive matrices. The power of 
a given ideology in relation to others is determined by 
its pertinent affirmations and sanctions” [Sl]. The 
‘sanitary idea’ described the links between society, 
nature and markets in ways that defined the prospects 
and justification for sanitary engineering directed by 
the expert advice of central government. The relevant 
affirmations and sanctions included the technological 
requirements of healthy urban living but they also 
included less technical issues such as a sanctity of 
property, the constitutional significance of autono- 
mous local government as a check on arbitrary 
central power, and the professional pretensions of 
established civil engineers whose work was held up to 
ridicule by Chadwick. Some of these forces acted in 
all fields of government growth while others were 
specific to public health reform 
There are close links between ideas and power, as 
Corrigan and Sayer note in speaking of “the three 
great ‘ideas’ which energised the system of national 
improvement hat was state formation in this period 
[the mid-nineteenth century]-the twin faces of ‘the 
statistical idea’ and ‘the educational idea’, and the 
much more subordinated (for it too much challenged 
local powers) ‘sanitary idea’ . ” [12, p. 1291. The 
‘sanitary idea’ contended on one hand with the rights 
of property and on the other with the need for 
effective legislation. If the latter could have been 
secured without offence to the former then Chadwick, 
an astute tactician, would undoubtedly have taken 
the more persuasive course. In the early 1840s there 
were those who believed that a milder course would 
actually work. Among them was Robert Slaney, and 
Richards has drawn attention to “one vital difference 
between Slaney’s plan and the Benthamite [Chad- 
wick’s] model the balance of power was to be with 
local and not central government” [52]. What Chad- 
wick achieved between 1842 and 1847 was to con- 
vince enough people favourable to reform that there 
was a contradiction between advocating effective 
national minimum standards and expecting to pro- 
ceed by waiting upon local initiative. In this he was 
right. When Chadwick was removed from the Gen- 
eral Board of Health, his successor was an arch 
localist, Benjamin Hall. A representative of London 
vestrydom, he was initially disposed to rely upon 
local initiative in solving London’s problems of 
drainage, sewerage and water supply. Nevertheless he 
soon “discovered that a laissez-faire policy simply 
would not answer and that central government must 
act positively” [53]. In short, Chadwick set up the 
best arguments with which to counter apathy, ob- 
struction and outright opposition 
Chadwick’s best arguments had to move beyond 
mere journalism. The public health agitation was 
politically and ideologically structured by the need to 
counter the claim that it was undermining the rights 
of property. Just as journalists who expect certain 
lines of censorship may end up censoring and re- 
stricting their own lines of investigation, so the public 
health reformers internalised the need to respect 
private property, an institution which they had no 
wish to overthrow. Consequently, they appealed to 
the most advanced defence of legislative interference 
within the framework of private property: Chad- 
wick’s version of philosophic radicalism. The sort of 
abstract defence if the market propounded in the 
writings of Bentham and associated philosophers and 
economists, allowed Chadwick to distance his attack 
on current market practices from a heretical deni- 
gration of capitalism as it was worshipped. He separ- 
ated the ideal from the reality. The ideal was a market 
consisting entirely of petty commodity producers. 
The reality of speculation, monopolies and excess 
profits fell outside this ideal of individualistic prod- 
uction and consumption. This strategy provided a 
continuity between the arguments of Joseph Hume in 
the early-nineteenth century and those of the much 
less radical Lord Morpeth in the 1840s. Morpeth’s 
commitment to this manoeuvre was clear in the way 
he defended himself against the charge that his 
Drainage of Towns Bill constituted an attack on 
private property. On the contrary, he argued, “specu- 
lators made exorbitant profits from the working 
classes being obliged to dwell in certain localities. It 
was these profits he meant to reduce” [54]. This lack 
of choice on the part of the poor undermined one of 
the assumptions under which a free market could be 
expected to produce equity; 
It is, therefore, a mistake to say that the poor are free agents 
in this respect: the fact is, that this necessity on the part of 
the poor gives the proprietors of these loathesome dens a 
command of the most he can by any means in his power. 
extort from his tenants [55]. 
Classical political economy was based on a series 
of moral precepts which sustained the ‘lessons’ it 
drew from the ‘working’ of the market. Perhaps the 
central term in this cosmology was ‘harmony’-a 
reconciliation of the ‘individual’ and the ‘social’, the 
‘short-term’ and the ‘long-term’. Nature ensured a 
harmony between the short-term pursuit of rational 
self-interest and the long-term welfare of both indi- 
vidual and society. If everyone behaved selfishly, 
nature would reward those who had behaved in a 
rational manner and punish those who had not. The 
anticontagionism of Chadwick and his associates 
was, in part, a defence of a conception of Nature as 
both loving parent and benevolent school-teacher. As 
MacLaren argues, disease, and especially capricious 
epidemic disease, posed problems for this view of 
things [56]. The difficulty was that even if failure to 
comply with the dictates of natural law always led to 
suffering, need it be conceded that much suffering 
could arise in quite different ways, by chance encoun- 
ters or whatever? It was difficult to see epidemic 
disease as the realisation of long-term processes 
unless the disease took advantage of failings that had 
already taken place. 
To retain their belief in the harmony between 
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natural (long-term) law and the (short-term) pursuit 
of rational self-interest, the public health agitators 
who took their cue from Chadwick had to believe 
that disease behaved in a rational manner. Cholera 
had to be tied to earlier actions. This explains their 
preference for a theory incorporating predisposing 
and efficient causes instead of one based on con- 
tingent contagionism. The idea of predisposing and 
efficient causes linked the immediate threat of disease 
both to environmental conditions and to earlier 
individual acts of intemperance or stupidity. The 
stochastic nature of contagionism threatened to place 
cholera beyond the workings of this natural har- 
mony. Under the regimen of predisposing and 
efficient causes, non-contagious cholera did not 
blindly shatter the fabric of nature, rather it worked 
along lines of previous weakness. 
Chadwick’s arguments about political and admin- 
istrative structures need to be seen in a similar light. 
From Hobbes, the philosophic radicals developed a 
conception of the State as the artificial identification 
of interests. The State was expected to provide the 
context within which the rational pursuit of self- 
interest could harmonise with natural law. Social 
engineering, however, was not compatible with direct 
democracy since the ability to decide upon ‘scientific’ 
questions was not widespread and also we must 
remember that Chadwick and many of his fellow- 
workers were professionals (lawyers, doctors, en- 
gineers) at a time when the landed classes were only 
starting to share power with this wider ruling class so 
that an element of self-interest was also involved. In 
order to ensure the expert identification of rational 
interests, social reform needed to be removed from 
the vagaries of ‘popular’ politics. Chadwick wanted 
to take technical questions out of the sphere of local 
politics altogether, and he even hoped to maintain a 
discrete distance from Parliament. As Corrigan com- 
ments, “the form of state surveillance and adminis- 
tration which Chadwick seemed to admire . . was 
parallel to Parliament, a series of standing commis- 
sions linked to the Privy Council” [57]. In line with 
this prejudice, Chadwick convicted the local auth- 
orities of ignorance and inertia. 
Turning to the sociological question of what holds 
society together, the Benthamite response was pri- 
marily psychological. Bentham saw society as the 
summary result of individual motivations. Social 
policy must aim at directing these impulses. The 
psychology of the individual was crucial to the use of 
the fehcific calculus. In the abstract, social policy 
should, according to Bentham, be directed towards 
maximising the sum of individual happinesses. In 
practice, this rested on the specification of the 
‘springs of happiness’: 
Bentham knew that the principle of the greatest happiness 
of the greatest number as the proper end of government was 
too general to be of much use in concrete cases. Accordingly 
he proposed that specific determinations should be made in 
the light of what he called the four subsidiary ends of legis- 
lation: security, subsistence, abundance and equality [SS]. 
To operationalise this specification, he satisfied him- 
self that security, and particularly security of prop- 
erty, was the primary end of government: “without 
some assurance that property will be protected, 
people would make little or no effect to create new 
wealth. The principal object of the law is, therefore, 
to take care of security for, in doing so, the other ends 
will be served as well” [58, p. 681. 
By making this defence of property central to their 
political theory, Benthamites could advocate reforms 
in ways which took cognisance of the dominant 
worry that reforms threatened the rights of individu- 
als to enjoy the full fruits flowing from private 
ownership. It explains why the public health move- 
ment couched its attacks on the water companies and 
commissions of sewer in terms of a championing of 
the morality of the market-the precepts of political 
economy. They had to convict these enterprises of 
mismanagement, propose alternative arrangements 
and show that these alternatives were necessary in 
market terms-only under these arrangements could 
the companies fulfil the obligations, as well as exploit 
the rights, of private property and provide a good, 
cheap service. This led Chadwick to assert that the 
principles of scientific sanitation were quite beyond 
the ken of the existing companies, residing solely with 
the public health movement itself. In all Chadwick 
had to convince himself and others that existing 
bodies were incompetent rather than impotent in 
order to justify the idea of expert control. 
Private property was the crucial political and ideo- 
logical bloc to public health reform. The fact that the 
arguments for reform were developed in the way 
outlined above underlines the nature of the ideo- 
logical battle that was fought. If pragmatic, sensible 
reforms would inevitably, eventually have been adop- 
ted, then, there is little evidence of that here. Given 
a straight choice between the general health and the 
individual property, the prospects for reform were so 
bleak that the choice had to be avoided and the 
distinction subverted. In this respect, the more dra- 
matic events such as cholera and typhus epidemics 
which might have been expected to clinch the case for 
reform if the major requirement was good journal- 
ism, needed to be treated very carefully by the 
reformers if the sophisticated intellectual case they 
were making was to be listened to. Repeated epi- 
demics or scares might jade the public palate while 
the fact that epidemics came and went made it 
difficult to sustain the case that the problems were 
continuously present. What is striking is the success 
of the public health arguments in the 1840s. Starting 
from a defence of the market and a celebration of the 
moral duties of private property, Chadwick suc- 
ceeded in convincing the public opinion to which 
parliamentarians felt answerable that the major ob- 
stacles to improvement were vested interests. Between 
1848 and 1854, the General Board of Health became 
tarred with the same brush and the water companies 
and private landlords had their revenge. On the back 
of claims that Chadwick’s General Board of Health 
existed simply to promote the careers of certain 
favoured sanitary engineers, the representatives of the 
London water companies secured Chadwick’s dis- 
missal from public life. For these vested interests, the 
defence of private property was the defence of a 
livelihood, a defence of an economic structure. In 
fact, the economic structure was not overthrown, it 
was manipulated within a range of constraints that 
increasing prosperity loosened a little with time. The 
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opposition of landlords and the poverty of tenants 
provided the background to a guerilla war between 
private property and public health reforms. 
There is a broad range of interpretations of the 
forces impelling and constraining government growth 
in the nineteenth century. The polar opposites may be 
characterised as the pragmatic and the ideological 
explanations [59]. The former emphasises the reason- 
able, gradual adoption of reforms shown to IX neces- 
sary by the social problems accompanying rapid 
urban-industrialisation. The political system is seen 
to be an automatic regulator of society matching 
perceived social needs to effective legislation. The 
obstacles to reform, on this reading, are ignorance 
and the sheer scale of the problems. In contrast, the 
ideoiogical school lays stress on a new idea in the 
growth of government, a new positive role for gov- 
ernment deriving from the schemes for legal reform 
systematically developed by Jeremy Bentham, the 
utilitarian philosopher, in the late-eighteenth century. 
Whereas under the pragmatic explanation ideas are 
of marginal significance, here they are the very con- 
tent of the legislative principle. The emphasis in this 
paper on the need for a fairly sophisticated ‘sanitary 
idea’ in presenting the case for reform is incompatible 
with the pragmatic approach, epitomised in this field 
by the works of Cherry and Ashworth [60, 611. The 
political significance of these historiographical dis- 
putes is roughly captured by Hart’s identification of 
the pragmatic approach as a ‘Tory’ interpretation of 
history [62]. Within the ideological approach there is 
a degree of uncertainty about the relations between 
Benthamite programmes and broader social and 
political forces. In reconstructing the logic of these 
arguments in one particular area, public health re- 
form, this paper has shown how great were the efforts 
made to keep the case for reform within the ideo- 
logical parameters et by a commitment o bourgeois 
property rights. In effect, though, small-scale land- 
lord property was politically marginalised by Chad- 
wick’s appeal to the need for the state to police 
market imperfections and, by making local govem- 
ment finance the vehicle for social reform, nineteenth- 
century government growth marginalised this group 
economically too. The fundamental economic forces 
behind the battle of ideas continually reasserted 
themselves leading eventually to the bankruptcy of 
the rented sector in English cities and the need for 
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